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Texte intégral 
Ever since Independence in 1962, the army has played a critical role in the political life of 
Algeria. "The army's prominence is based on three factors: its historical legitimacy, the 
personal popularity and charisma of Colonel Houari Boumediene, and the army's populist 
discourse, which offered the prospect of a form of social and economic development oriented 
towards poverty alleviation. By the start of crisis in the 1980s, the historical legitimacy of the 
army had declined with the renewal of succeeding generations. Having failed to deliver on its 
promises, the populist discourse had also lost its credibility and influence.[1] From being 
based on the charismatic leadership of a popular figure, the Algerian regime evolved into a 
military oligarchy after the death of Boumédiene in 1978. The appointment of the notably 
uncharismatic and politically unambitious officer, Colonel Chadli Bendjedid, as President in 
1978 was to lead the regime into a particularly violent period of crisis. In an effort to escape 
from this dead-end, the same regime that had appointed Bendjedid then nominated Abdelaziz 
Bouteflika as President. By doing so, the regime expressed the desire to turn back the clock 
and return to the successes of the past, by choosing in Bouteflika a former 'brother in arms' of 
Boumediene. 
Among what are commonly known as 'political armies', Algeria is a case in point. As a 
country of the Third World where independence was obtained through a war of national 
liberation, the army had acquired a considerable degree of historical legitimacy as a result of 
this experience. The army came to be identified as the main source of political power in the 
new state. During the 1960s and 1970s, the popularity of the regime was bolstered by its 
leader, the charismatic Colonel Houari Boumediene (1965 - 1978). What undermined the 
confidence of the ruled in their rulers was the failure of the whole development project, 
promised by official policy statements, and undermined by demographic changes (with the 
population having tripled in fourty years). The result was a profound sense of social malaise 
and discontent. During the 1980s, the regime was buffeted by pressures caused by internal 
and external changes and tried to break free of its past policies. However there were serious 
and undeniable political obstacles in its way, which resulted in a dangerous lack of political 
reform, and a tendency for stagnation. 
These obstacles will be analyzed in relation to the army's political role, making it possible for 
us to understand the nature of the violent crisis that has beset the country since 1992. 
Nevertheless, it is first necessary to define a key notion that will be much used in this 
research; namely the notion of a political army. Basically, an army can be said to be 'political' 
when it is itself the main source of state power, and presents itself as the key holder of 
political legitimacy. In Algeria, there is a political army in this sense, since the army itself 
appoints the President and the members of the government. The army also intervenes in the 
political domain, under the supervision of a special service, the Securite Militaire (Military 
Security), which is under the control of the Ministry of Defence. 
The regime in Algeria has always sought to minimize the importance of the army in the 
construction of state power, but with violent confrontation from the Islamists, the real picture 
emerged, through the use of the Military Security forces. In general, both researchers and 
public opinion have had a tendency to ignore the army's supremacy in Algeria, even though 
this is clearly a central dimension of the country's overall political sociology. Nevertheless the 
serious crisis which shook Algeria in 1992, unavoidably focused public and media attention 
onto the military hierarchy, which now appeared openly as the single main actor in the 
political arena. To get a better understanding of the role of the army, it is important to bear in 
mind its pivotal place at the origin of the present Algerian political system, and to grasp the 
strength of the army's connection to the very idea of the Algerian nation. When Boumediene, 
then Minister of Defence, deposed the elected President Ben Bella, in June 1965, despite the 
latter's election two years previously, this coup was carried out in the name of historical 
legitimacy.[2] It was also in the name of restoring historical legitimacy that Boumediene then 
appointed Chadli Bendjedid as President in 1979, and in 1992 proceeded to oust him on the 
same grounds. Even the decision to annul the elections of December 1991, in which the 
Islamists won the majority of the vote, was taken in the name of historical legitimacy. This 
time M. Boudiaf, who was a co-founder of the FLN and in exile since independence, was the 
one called on. In all these cases, the army's position in Algerian political life is closely tied in 
with the whole question of historical legitimacy, which is itself a critical issue for any 
political system, whatever its complexion. 
The Bipolar Nature of Power; A 
Contradiction in Motion
The main contradiction, within the Algerian political regime is the bipolar nature of power 
relations. On the basis of this bipolarity, opposing 'clans' are formed, each of which seeks to 
control the State administration. Even seeking to discover who really controls political power 
in Algeria is not a neutral exercise, since it involves unveiling the mechanisms for the 
reproduction and distribution of political power, as well as the inner contradictions of the 
regime itself, and the violent crisis it is experiencing. The two-sided structure of State power 
frames the whole field of political life. For this reason, it is necessary to examine this 
bipolarity in more detail, so as to integrate the nature of the Algerian power structure into the 
whole history of the nationalist movement in the post-independence era. The bipolarization of 
the regime is not recognized in the official discourse because the legitimate power of the army 
is neither institutionalized, nor constitutional. There thus arises a gap between rhetoric and 
reality, between the officially sanctioned lines of authority within State institutions and the 
influence of informal networks on decision making at different levels of the State 
bureaucracy. At an Individual level, military personnel are among those most critical of the 
inefficiency and incompetence of State administrative personnel. Yet they do not see the 
connection between the lack of competence, and their own controlling role over the powers of 
State. Any senior military officer finds it perfectly normal, for example, that it is the military 
that gives the go-ahead for forming a new government, and gives detailed advice on which 
civilians are to be selected to form part of such a government.[3]
For the military, such privileges are justified by its role of providing historical legitimacy to 
the political leadership, given the army's place in the foundation of the State. Nonetheless, the 
military has generally veered away from installing a military regime as such, given the 
legacies of the anti-colonial struggle. This is why, despite the importance of the army, the 
Algerian regime is not a military regime, let alone a military dictatorship of the Latin 
American type. It is, instead, an authoritarian regime which in large part derives its legitimacy 
from the armed forces. The Army, in turn, expects the regime in power to prevent any 
independent civil society forces from emerging, and thus avoid the public institutionalization 
of conflict.[4] The roots of the authoritarianism of the Algerian state are not found in its 
military origins, but rather in the populist Ideology which the army upholds. It is as if the 
latter has consistently demanded, since 1962, that the State administration should create a new 
society based on equal citizenship, and underpinned by State guarantees, with everyone 
depending on the State for their subsistence. 
From this point of view, one can interpret the historical legitimacy of the Army as a potent 
political resource, which allows the army itself to intervene in politics - both directly and 
indirectly - in order to bring about the desired adjustments in Government policies and to 
carry out the role entrusted to it Thus, for example, stressing the uniqueness of the party and 
placing the economy under state control in the name of socialism, was to control society and 
prevent the emergence of autonomous and potentially rival political, economic and cultural 
elites. This explains why economic reforms, required since the mid-1980s, have never been 
applied. If such reforms ever were implemented, the inevitable result would be the withdrawal 
of the State from the economic sphere. The political cost would be that the State was obliged 
to abandon its capacity to use material resources for political ends, in order to control 
Algerian society. Privatization policies do not fit in with the established order, in which the 
Army controls the State, which in turn controls society. 
An absolutist and authoritarian understanding of power underpins the military's ideological 
outlook, in which power is seen as an end in itself, and a necessary means of dominating 
society in order to deny or stifle political conflict. This form of power has been perpetuated at 
the cost of the weakening of civil society, particularly in the economic and cultural spheres. In 
this way, State power has undermined itself too, since the limits of political power depend on 
what society as a whole can provide. At the same time, the army's 'political cultural' is 
historically speaking one legacy of a colonial system that consistently refused to make any 
concessions that might improve the tot of Algerian people, or enable them to participate in the 
political affairs of their own country. After World War Two, independence through armed 
struggle was the only way out of this anachronistic position. Legitimately engaged in 
revolutionary violence, the FLN was born out of the very rigidity of the colonial system to 
which it was opposed. Having been submitted to a brutal form of domination under French 
colonialism, Algerians adopted violence as a means of resolving political conflicts. 
Independence was achieved only after seven and a half years of war, and at the cost of several 
hundred thousand lives. As Independence was seized through revolutionary violence, an 
Algerian State was established under the overall control of the Army. This remains the 
situation today, with the armed forces acting rather like a single party regime that cannot 
tolerate any opposition to its own monopoly position. The dominant culture of violence 
remains deeply ingrained among the ruling class, and largely accounts for their persistent 
intolerance towards any kind of freedom of expression, 
It should not be forgotten that the FLN itself disintegrated shortly after independence. The 
movement was in a sense reintegrated, or absorbed into the army in the form of a populist 
ideology which preserved the FLN's role symbolically; the army thereby came to embody the 
historical heritage of the FLN. In portraying itself as the soul of the Nation and the conscience 
of the State, the army drew on this legacy and on the collective memory of what the FLN 
represented. The regime's populism was expressed most starkly by Colonel Boumediene, and 
in particular in his opposition to multipartism, which he regarded as divisive of the general 
national interest. As Algeria's political leaders were fond of reminding everyone, the old 
political parties had not been able to bring about the downfall of the colonial regime, and had 
done no more than create divisions among the general mass of the population. In addition, 
more recently created political parties are accused of recreating the inequalities of the colonial 
system through sanctioning private property. The army therefore presents itself as the 
champion of the whole nation, opposed to the legalization of political parties and devoted to 
the defence of the Nation from all its internal and external enemies. 
Houari Boumediene: A Charismatic 
Military Leader
During the war of 1954-62 political instability arose out of the numerous conflicts that 
emerged between the leadership of the nationalist movement and the local authorities in the 
maquis (i.e. the regional leaders of the Revolutionary Movement). Boumédiène, commander 
of wilaya V, became Chief of Staff in 1959, and was assigned the task of displining these 
maquis and imposing political and military order among them. From the time of 
independence, the classical army structure that Boumediene started to organize in Tunisia and 
Morocco was designed to neutralize any moves towards insubordination among leaders of 
maquis in the Interior. In the meantime, Boumediene refused to take over the reins of power 
himself, and instead he invited Ahmed Ben Bella to act as Head of State. Whilst the head of 
the armed forces nominated the head of State, the latter formally appointed the former as 
Minister of Defence. Boumediene was able to unify the army and reintegrated former 
combatants from the interior of the country; as Minister of Defence, he subsequently emerged 
as the dispenser of political authority, and no major political decision could be taken without 
his agreement. 
From 1962 onwards, state power in Algeria was divided into two distinct forms; the legitimate 
power of the army, and the 'executive power' of the President and Government. The constant 
battle between these two forms of power for control over the State has affected Algerian 
political life since independence. In seeking to assert his relative independence from 
Boumediene, President Ben Bella relied on Colonel Tahar Zbiri, whom he appointed as 
Major-General without consulting his own Minister of Defence. Ultimately, the friction 
between Ben Bella and Boumediene found expression In the coup d'etat of 19 June 1965, 
which some referred to as a simple 'readjustment, given that the number of people removed 
from office was fairly few.[5] In fact, within the terms of the logic of the regime, the contest 
between legitimate power' and 'executive power' now resolved itself fatally in favour of the 
former, 
In seizing executive power himself, Boumediene took the precaution of not appointing a head 
of the army, in order to avoid falling victim himself to the same deadly logic that had afflicted 
his predecessor. He therefore retained the post of Minister of Defence for himself, and created 
a 'Revolutionary Council'. He himself presided over this collective body, which was declared 
the ultimate repository of national sovereignty and historical legitimacy. In creating this 
public institution, Boumediene was able to avoid accusations of personal ambition, whilst 
using the Council as a cover behind which important decisions could be made. The subtle 
fiction of collectivism was doubly advantageous: it institutionalized historical legitimacy by 
detaching it from the military hierarchy, and on the other hand, it allowed Boumediene, as 
President of the Revolutionary Council and Head of State, to keep a firm hold simultaneously 
on legitimate and executive power.[6] In this way, he was conforming to the logic of a 
political system which, whilst tending to concentrate power in the hands of a single 
individual, was also opposed to personalistic forms of political leadership. Even the fiction of 
collective decision making, behind which Boumediene hid, could not protect him from a near-
successful attempt by the Chief of Staff, Colonel Zbiri, in December 1967, to militarily 
overthrow the regime. 
After this coup attempt ended in failure, and in order to guard against any further disturbances 
of the military machinery, Boumediene initiated a wide-ranging programme of economic and 
social reform, and sought to associate these changes with his own persona. Further feeble 
attempts by the military to oust Boumediene were hopeless, given the degree of popular 
attachment to him as a political leader, and given his own close identification with the 
national liberation movement - out of which the army itself had arisen. The president was able 
to undermine his potential rivals in the armed forces by keeping himself somewhat aloof from 
his original power base within the army, and by advocating a more populist set of economic 
and social policies. These included plans for mass industrialization, an agrarian revolution, 
public enterprises run along socialist lines, and free state services for all, Including health 
care. All this went hand in hand with a more overtly charismatic and personalistic style of 
leadership, which was eventually rejected by the Algerians.[7]
This programme, incorporating economic modernization, radical agricultural reform, social 
justice through, universal education, free health care and the creation of employment, did 
reflect the expression of many Algerians' popular aspirations after independence. In giving 
priority to these goals, Boumédiène transformed himself into a charismatic leader who 
inspired the confidence of local communities. For the most part, the Algerian public trusted 
him as a leader whose personal legitimacy was based on the personal qualities he placed at the 
service of the society's shared goals and visions (material progress; the equitable distribution 
of resources, and the achievement of other Utopian aims buried within the collective 
unconscious of the Algerian populace). After several years of turbulence during the 1960s, 
state power was consolidated around Boumédiène himself, who came to be regarded as the 
repositary of legitimacy, in large part because in his speeches and pronouncements he 
forcefully expressed the aspirations and hopes of ordinary Algerians, giving the 'people' the 
feeling that they were taking a more direct part in political life through his own intervention 
and personality. 
Boumediene was able to mobilize popular political energies for the benefit of the State public 
administration, to which the specific task of developing Algeria's economy was allocated. 
However, personal charisma is neither a stable base for rule nor an inexhaustible source of 
legitimacy. Maintaining charisma depends on the constant juggling act of matching public 
expectations and demands with the resources available to satisfy such demands, both 
materially and symbolically. In this particular political climate, the cult of the leader produces 
the illusion that injustices can be redressed. It must be said also that Boumediene was 
certainly a skilled leader, who resorted to the use of force only when there was no other 
option available. Under his Presidency, Algeria experienced a period of relative peace and 
stability which was unusual in its history. Although he knew how to exercise control over 
people, Boumediene nonetheless did not have much understanding of modern economic and 
political culture. He had a quasi-mystical belief in the ability of the State, provided it was run 
by well trained, able and committed officials and bureaucrats. His vision was one where 
politics was rooted in the Individual psychology of policy-makers. If his conception of the 
ideal Algerian society had not been so Utopian and unrealistic and led the country into crisis, 
Boumediene might have been a twentieth century Massinissa or Abdelmoumen.[8]
Generally speaking, for the Algerian elite the underlying problem that emerged from the war 
of liberation was the question of how to construct a non-partisan State capable of controlling a 
conflict-free society; in achieving this, the option of establishing particular Institutions to deal 
with problems of legitimacy and sovereignty has not even been considered. Algerian society 
has tended to both naturalize the whole question of state legitimacy and to fetishize 
sovereignty, through a political discourse that formally denied yet simultaneously 
mythologized these qualities. Whether applied to the nationalist discourse of the army or to 
the Islamic discourse, tin's political dilemma had to be resolved one way or the other. It is 
useful to remind ourselves of the meaning of such terms as legitimacy and sovereignty, both 
in theory and in relation to practice. We will now consider some of the ways in which such 
questions of legitimacy and sovereignty have arisen in the context of Algeria. 
Political Legitimacy and Sovereign Power
It is possible to distinguish sovereign power from executive power within the dominant 
structure of the State. Sovereign power is held in the name of legitimacy, and executive power 
is exercised by the Government and distributed among the various administrative levels, from 
the Minister to the administrator. Sovereign power is delegated to the authority of the 
Government in place, which is responsible for administrative affairs and the management of 
the mainly oil-based revenues. In organic terms, State power is a form of hierarchy, in which 
each level has the prerogative to be obeyed by the level below. At various levels of the 
administrative ladder, a subtle pecking order distributes power so that each successive rank 
has progressively more power than that below it, and less than the rank above. 
There is however a difference in the nature of power allocated to the top tiers of the State 
administration, compared with power at other levels. The upper echelons derive their power 
from outside the hierarchy, and on the basis of a form of legitimacy that created the 
hierarchical structure of the State in the first place. The external source of this elite's power is 
the constituent legitimacy of the State itself, which ensures the general consent of the 
governed. The State bureaucracy functions as an administration which passes on orders 
through delegation. Within this structure, the head of Slate is delegated by sovereign power 
(the king or queen in a monarchy, the electorate in a democracy, and the army in Algeria's 
case). It is this that gives the leader the ability to take advantage of his authority to direct the 
state administration and to obtain the general compliance of the governed. 
Legitimacy establishes the basis for administrative authority, and makes it possible for such 
authority to be accepted without excessive use of physical force or coercion. Legitimacy is 
also expressed through the shared consent of the popular majority, who agree to obey those in 
authority and State power.[9] Legitimacy - in other words the internalized belief of me 
governed, whether subjects or citizens, which leads them to voluntarily obey without being 
physically forced to do so - is an essential basis of State power, and for that matter of any 
other form of power relationship. This form of power enables those who govern to secure the 
obedience of the majority of those over whom they rule. If necessary, force will also be used 
to gain the compliance of a minority to the norms of the established order. Legitimacy, In this 
sense, is the mechanism by which a majority of the population supports a political regime, and 
recognizes it as operating in the people's general Interest 
The operational efficacy of legitimacy in this sense depends on the belief among the majority 
that the regime is well intentioned, and that it is committed to protecting and promoting the 
general interest, whatever difficulties it may face in doing so. The power of the State 
authorities to impose itself is derived from the mobilization of the energies of this majority; 
what matters in this context is not the ability of the State to exercise physical force In order to 
gain compliance, but rather its ability to derive legitimacy from popular beliefs. If political 
authority is regarded as legitimate, then those in power can mobilize the potential energies of 
all those who hold this view, for example in order to use it in confrontation with any minority 
that might not acknowledge the legitimacy of the regime. This mobilization of the majority 
makes it possible to defend the existing political system. In Algeria, the legitimacy of the 
political system, as in any other case, is historically rooted; in this case it is indissolubly 
linked with the national liberation struggle that was waged in order to bring an end to colonial 
domination. Legitimacy is first and foremost the product of historical processes; processes 
which may combine to lend it great efficacy or alternately may serve to remove its capacity to 
function effectively. To put it another way, legitimacy always has a historical dimension, and 
unless it is actively renewed and reconfirmed, can lose its ability to underpin State power and 
effectively integrate the masses. 
For reasons to do with the country's history, the Algeria regime established itself as an 
administrative State (the State being reduced to the bare bones of its administrative structure). 
Within such a framework, sovereignty is neither officially declared nor located within 
particular institutions, as it would be in a ideal type legal-rational state structure. Legitimate 
power, in this context, is hidden behind institutions which have no basis in political reality, 
and in this sense prevents the national community from becoming aware of its own ability to 
exercise powers of sovereignty. This fear of public exposure arises neither out of cynicism nor 
machiaveliianism, but out of the fact that the political sphere is not clearly distinguished from 
the religious and social spheres. The military hierarchy, from which such legitimacy is 
derived, is not even aware that it displaces the electorate by exercising sovereignty in its 
place. The electorate in turn does not ask for this sovereignty back, so long as it considers that 
it is being wisely used. 
Patriarchal communal structures of authority are not aware of themselves as autonomous from 
the great meta-social forms of security, as Alain Touraine calls them, of God, Nature, History 
and Morality.[10] Members of such a society do not seek to exercise their sovereignty, or at 
least not in the institutional forms usual in a parliamentary democracy.[11] At this point, it 
can be emphasized that the problem of sovereignty only arises in a society where there is 
functional differentiation, but not in a context where political, psychological, religious and 
moral spheres lack autonomy from each other.[12] In the few ideological texts that exist, the 
Army refers to national sovereignty as something which it protects from external attack. No 
reference is made to popular sovereignty, as expressed through universal suffrage. The army 
identifies itself with the collectivism of the Algerian nation, but not with the electorate as 
such. The electorate is ignored since it is assumed that there are no political conflicts among 
Algerian citizens, and therefore is no need to go through the periodic process of sorting out a 
majority and minority in terms of public opinion. 
The only conflicts which are acknowledged openly are those between Algerians and 
foreigners, and between patriots and traitors. The latter conflict is not to be formalized in any 
case, since the only solution is to physically wipe out; or exterminate, the traitors. This 
approach accounts for the bloody nature of the present crisis, since for one side traitors 
include all those opposed to the national community, and for the other side the traitors are all 
those opposed to Islam, which is taken to define the political community. In neither of these 
forms of antagonistic political discourse does the notion emerge of an electoral body, or of 
popular political sovereignty. This is because such notions pre-suppose a sense of a neutral 
public space, in which the individual can exercise their civil and political freedoms, and in 
which a minority has the recognized right to oppose the majority. 
In such a context, the rule of law, In the sense of a system of modern law based on popular 
sovereignty, is simply not possible. This is because the political leadership does not consider 
itself sovereign and allows the army, or - in the case of the Islamists if they ever came to 
power - would allow an Islamic army to control the process of legitimation. This situation can 
account for the laziness or the zeal with which those in power violate the juridical regulations 
they themselves put in place, and which in theory have the force of law for every citizen. 
Various competing clans and their followers even go so far as to parade their ability to break 
existing regulations with impunity, In order to demonstrate their powerful position. In short, 
laws which are put into force by the State administration are ignored or respected according to 
the relative dominance of various political dans. Any individual without a dan of their own is 
delivered to the arbitrariness of the Hobbesian state. He or she must pay in order to benefit 
from any law that accords some civil rights, and must also pai if he or she wants to escape 
from the constraints imposed by a particular piece of legislation. This double-bind means that 
public officials have exorbitant powers, since they are In a position to interpret the law, and 
also to decide whether to apply it or not in a particular situation, depending on the relative 
advantage they can draw from either option. The growing gap between the population and the 
State arises out of this form of administrative power and the tendency for officials to abuse 
the public and submit them to corruption and arbitrary governance. "The reforms instituted in 
the early 1980s In Algeria were intended to dose this gap between the State and the people, 
and to stabilize the regime in power. It was the ambiguity of reforms intended to consolidate 
the status quo, which helped to provoke the violent crisis now facing the country. 
The Ambiguity of Political Reform under 
Chadli Bendjedid
When Boumédiene died in 1978, the Army was opposed to the Idea of reviving the 
Revolutionary Council, believing that this body had worked against their Interests. They 
therefore appointed as Boumediene's successor the Regional military commander Chadli 
Bendjedid, who lacked his predecessor's dominant personality. The newly appointed President 
was unable to impose himself on his peers, and lacked the charisma needed to embody 
legitimacy. The regime thus entered a period of crisis and paralysis, which would work to the 
benefit of the Islamists. When they appointed Benjedid as President, the Army undermined 
the foundation on which the regime was constructed, and created a political vacuum that the 
Islamists would come to fill. Across different societies, experience suggests that legitimacy is 
expressed either through particular persons (in the form of charismatic domination) or in the 
more depersonalized form of institutional power (In the form of the modern State and legal-
rational authority).[13] So long as the political sphere is not separate from forms of mystical 
nationalist and religious ideology, power will tend to be identified with a particular human 
being, namely a charismatic personality in which the members of the national community 
recognize themselves. This charismatic personality is expected to ensure the unity and 
cohesion of'the nation by defending it, or rather by organizing the nation to defend itself 
against any external threats.[14] The fatal mistake of the Army has been to refuse both 
charismatic, leadership and free elections, instead preferring political leaders with limited 
abilities, who are installed as President. Examples irclude Chadli Bendjedid, Ali Kafi, L 
Zéroual and A. Bouteflika. One of the few exceptions was Boudiafi, who was assassinated. 
The charismatic authority of the Leader is essential to the ability of the patriarchally 
structured regime to reproduce itself. This regime needs the leader whose legitimacy is based 
on a populist form of political discourse, which translates symbolic values and images into 
political terms. The personal qualities of the Leader are essential to the regime's continued 
survival; he must be an arbiter, and must be strongly committed to his office, devoting many 
hours per day to his work. Such qualities certainly distinguished Boumediene from his 
successor, although it is also true that Chadli Bendjedid's term of office was during a difficult 
time, the model put in place by his predecessor having reached the end of Its useful life, and 
the period being marked by the collapse of world oil prices in 1985-86, The Government 
initiated reforms which were intended to improve the productivity of the economy, but their 
reforms were thrown out by the Army, which considered them too liberal and feared-that the 
free market would undermine the political capacity of the populist project. 
The regime in power in Algeria provoked a crisis that was potentially fatal for its future 
survival. It did this by failing to put in power a leader with whom the public could identify, 
and by failing to create institutions with the capacity to regulate power relations between the 
State and the public. The lack of dear leadership created a vacuum which the Islamists were to 
exploit by taking power, whether through the ballot box or by force, Chadli Bendjedid tried to 
give a constitutional basis to the single party system, and thus to institutionalize power. When 
the Revolutionary Council was abolished, it was replaced by an elected Assembly, which 
became the official holder of national sovereignty. In reality, however, control over national 
sovereignty remained firmly in the control of the Army through the office of the President, 
who was elected through universal suffrage at the end of an electoral campaign run by a 
single party in support of a single candidate. The Constitution allows the President to derive 
his power from the electorate, and this enables him. to form the government and outline to the 
government the political and social policies that he has promised to implement But this 
constitutional image is illusory, given that the President himself is chosen by the military 
elite; the electorate is asked to ratify the military's choice, and the President is as a result 
highly dependent on the military elite that has selected him. The President can play off one 
faction or clan against another. Within limits, he can also choose who his collaborators will 
be, but his room for manoeuvre Is strictly limited since he cannot himself take over the 
legitimate power of the army. With such dependency on the Army, a special relationship is 
maintained between the Presidency and the Ministry of Defence, which influences the 
Presidency politically and in personal terms. Formally speaking, these kinds of influences 
should be coming from trie FIN, the single party. 
Officially, the FLN controlled the country and was the basis of political authority. Observing 
the real workings of the institutions of power and the relative weight of the party vis a vis 
public officials and the Army, suggests that the official supremacy of the party was a 
myth.[15] Both under Boumediene and his successor, Bendjedid (1579-1992), the FLN was 
organized as an administrative arm of the state, with its own hierarchy and budget, under the 
control of the President's office. The Party never played any major political role, and never 
took part in any Important decisions. Instead it operated as an outer garment for a regime 
where the army played the role of a dominant single party, and was thus the main source of 
political power. Under the cover of the FLN, any political debate that did not take place 
within the party structure was prohibited, so as to neutralize any local challenges to the 
dominant political order. In particular, the goal was to prevent the emergence of new elites, 
and to prevent them, from gaining any autonomy. As living conditions deteriorated and 
corruption became an increasing problem, the flaws in this system were exposed, and this 
provoked various internal and external challenges to the system. After the riots of October 
1988 (which caused the death of dozens of young protestors), the regime was obliged to 
introduce a number of institutional reforms in order to ensure its own survival. 
As a leader, Chadfi Bendjedid believed in the importance of formal institutional structures 
inherited by his regime. The system he inherited lacked flexibility, and the changes he 
introduced created additional obstacles to effective decision making. Bendjedid gave the party 
an importance that it lacked under Boumediene, and he expected the National Assembly to 
play its proper part within a parliamentary system. He also created the post of Prime Minister, 
under the control of the Assembly. At the same time, he introduced some notable changes in 
the organization of the army, including the creation of the rank of general. The greatest 
change in the organization of the army, however, was the decision to marginalize Military 
Security forces, having restricted these forces and having limited these Security forces' 
powers to those directly attributed by official regulations. All these reforms appeared obvious 
enough to Chadii Benjedid, but having introduced such reforms, his, regime lost much of its 
coherence in the 1980s. Ministers were used to implementing the orders of Boumediene, and 
hesitated to take any decisions, preferring to wait - as in Boumediene's time - for instructions 
from President himself. As the system became blocked, and was confronted with the collapse 
of world petroleum prices, paralysis resulted as clan competition for shrinking resources 
intensified. The regime was organizationally incapable of being reformed. The only options 
were either to reinforce the existing logic in order to restore some coherence and hence some 
effectiveness to the regime, or alternatively to create a completely new regime in which the 
army would cease to hold the reins of power, lacking the breadth of vision required, unable to 
master the subtleties of politics, and above all incapable of intellectual insight, Chadli 
Bendjedid was unable to manage the transition which he wished to see through following the 
riots of October 1988. 
Democratic reforms were introduced through the Constitution of February 1989, but the 
binary nature of State power, which the military hoped to preserve intact, proved a stumbling 
block to genuine democratization. The military agreed to open up the political system and 
allow the operation of a multi-party system, electoral competition, freedom of the press to 
restrain corruption and to improve the overall credibility and effectiveness to the regime. 
They believed that multi-partyism would revive the fortunes of the FLN through electoral 
competition. The purpose of the democratization process was thus to bring about an 
institutional reshuffle, by deriving executive power from the ballot box without undermining 
the unwritten, underlying constitution of the regime that the Army is the basis of State power. 
The military did not fear the outcome of the elections, since they expected the FLN to reach a 
compromise with the FIS within the National Assembly, and form, a government which 
would continue to recognize the overall legitimate power of the Army. What resulted, namely 
the outright victory of the FIS, threatened the political hegemony of the army. There was the 
distinct danger that a. single party, not the FLN, would form a Government without any 
reference to the Army, and might even impose its own Minister of Defence. "This would have 
meant the installation of a new regime, the end of the bipolar structure of State power, and the 
end of the Army's legitimate power. 
The paradox of democratization in Algeria was that the existing political leadership sought to 
bring electoral legitimacy, which sanctioned the Government, in line with historical 
legitimacy, which was embodied in the Army. The military authorities expected these two 
forms of legitimacy to coincide, and thus to restore to the regime its popularity and to reduce 
the level of corruption and inefficiency in the public administration of the country, In its 
attempt to resolve the problem of corruption, the military exposed a fatal flaw in the 
underpinnings of their own position. They ignored that any system rests on a single power 
base, with only one ultimate source of legitimacy. Far from strengthening the regime, the 
constitutional reforms of February 1989 hastened the liquidation of the regime, bringing about 
a violent crisis. The regime sought to escape from this crisis by reverting to the strategies of 
the 1960s, and this was symbolized in the return of Bouteflika, a former Minister under 
Boumediene. The current regime's composition is incompatible with multi-party politics, 
since its leaders accept neither the independence of the judicial system, nor the principle of 
freedom of expression, nor the outcome of free elections. 
The Presidency of Abdelaziz Bouteflika
The appointment of Bouteflika as the Army's preferred candidate In the Presidential elections 
of April 1999 was a sign of changes the military wanted to usher in. By choosing a civilian, 
who had been one of Boumédiène's close and faithful comrades, suggested a desire to 
reinforce the message that the regime was not a military regime, whilst also suggesting the 
desire for a return to the past and the era of Boumediene, although under a President who 
lacked the authority of a more charismatic Head of State. His selection also served another 
purpose; Bouteflika was Minister of Foreign Affairs for some time, and was selected for his 
knowledge of international institutions, which would be of use in defusing external pressure 
that came from international NGOs objecting to Algeria's abuses of human rights. At first die 
Army gave Bouteflika some room for manoeuvre, and were prepared to forego their usual role 
of selecting the government, even though the negative consequences of the government's 
economic and social policies would reflect back on the Army. A clear line was traced, 
nonetheless, separating the civilian regime from the domain controlled by the army (this 
included the appointment of the Minister of Defence, selection for promotion within the 
armed forces, the military budget, overall charge of the FIS affair, and the question of the 
Western Sahara). The President was entitled to appoint other Ministers, including for 
Housing, Health, Tourism and so on. 
Following the underlying premise that the civilian President would not stray Into the Army's 
"private domain', the presidential election of 15 April 1999 fitted into the logic of restoring a 
central role to the armed forces. It is worth pointing out that the usual 'conclave' of generals 
did not meet in order to select Bouteflika as presidential candidate. Instead, General 
Mohamed Lamari, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, decided against such a meeting, 
leaving the Head of Military Security, General Tewfik Mediene free to oversee the security 
operation known as 'presidential election', which was to replace the outgoing Zerouat.[16] 
Military Security was in charge of organizing the elections, and ruled out any candidates who 
could not be controlled or were thought capable of winning the election and using their power 
against the Army and Military Security. However for the elections to be credible, opposition 
candidates had to be encouraged to present themselves. A non-violent and loyal opposition, 
which, whilst not necessarily accepting tine supremacy of the Army, did not wish to take over 
power itself, was essential to the regime. This loyal opposition would be rewarded by being 
allocated a few ministerial positions. 
The military's aversion to a strong President has been a constant feature of Algerian politics 
since the death of Boumediene. Given this aversion, those who have been appointed have 
lacked the broad appeal of a popular leader. Bouteflika was no exception, even though some 
statements which he made during his first few months in office caused concern, since they 
reflected a wider critique of the State by ordinary Algerians. Bouteflika undermined himself 
by talking too much, and sometimes in an incoherent and brash manner - and above all by not 
having taken any action which would suggest he was in overall control of the Army. His main 
aim seems to be to recreate the political system of the 1970s, based on external respect and on 
fear in the domestic arena. In trying to achieve this objective, he relies on outdated and weak 
modes of populist and third worldist rhetoric. The only way that Bouteflika could succeed in 
his goals, is if he were able to combine in his own person both the real and formal powers of 
State. This is highly unlikely, however, in view of the present fracture between the regime and 
society, which has tended to give the Army an even greater political role than before. 
Although they have clearly indicated that there is a line over which he must not stray, the 
military distrust Bouteflika because of his unpredictability and his lack of coherence. In order 
to protect themselves against any unpleasant surprises, they have appointed General Larbi 
Beikheir - who previously held the same post under Bendjedid, as Principal Private Secretary. 
Bouteflika was not able to refuse this nomination, but in accepting it he compounded the 
incoherence of his own position; having blamed the on-going crisis on the policies of 
Bendjedid, he now accepted into his government Larbi Beikheir, who had been the main 
architects of those very policies. 
To overcome his loss of legitimacy since being designated by the military, the newly elected 
President is doing whatever he can to gain popularity. He is seeking to initiate a peace process 
which can bring an end to the violent crisis Algeria is facing, and which has already claimed 
hundre thousand deaths since the national elections of December 1991, which were won by 
the Islamists, were cancelled. The Government introduced a new law, known as the 'law of 
civil concord', which was intended to release all imprisoned Islamists who had taken part in 
the uprising against the regime, provided that they had not been not involved in violent 
crimes. The project was discussed and adopted by the National Assembly and then subjected 
to a referendum in September 1999, when the majority of Algerians voted to accept the new 
law. President Bouteflika is aware that me majority of Algerians want peace, and seeks to 
promote an image of himself as a peace-maker. The task is a difficult one, however, and there 
are many obstacles in the way. 
There are two possible scenarios. Either Bouteflika may submit to the conventional logic of 
the Algerian political system, in which the President obeys the informal power of the Army, 
even though he has formal authority over the Army.[17] Or he refuses to accept this logic, 
since it makes him a puppet of the Army, and insists on exercising authority over all the 
institutions of Slate, including the Army itself. If he adopts the latter approach, Bouteflika will 
be confronted with fierce opposition, as was Chadli Bendjedfd when he was forced to resign 
in January 1992. After this, Mohamed Boudlaf was publicly assassinated in June 1992, and 
Liamine Zeroual's Presidential mandate was prematurely brought to end [18]. The golden rule 
In politics since at least the time of Machiavelli is that there is no room for both the King and 
those who make kings. If Bouteflika wishes to control the army, he needs to appoint new high 
ranking officers so as to ensure their support given that they owe their promotion to him. But 
any such appointment would raise suspicion among those in control of the President's 
security. If they felt threatened, they might somehow remove him from office altogether. 
Bouteflika's main problem is that he can not wield power as extensively as those who 
designated him as President. The Army is still in control; and either Bouteflika gets rid of 
high ranking officers, or he agrees to be a puppet in their hands. Can he remove the high 
ranking officers who selected him as President? Only time can tell if that is be possible. 
Bouteflika not only has to be concerned with the military; he also has to worry about the what 
the Islamists are doing. In his relationship with them, he is mainly concerned if he will be 
recognized as the legitimate President. He also has the credentials needed to initiate a 
dialogue with the Islamists. He took part in the liberation war against France, which in itself 
gives him historical legitimacy. One of the accusations of the Islamists is that many high 
ranking officers in the Algerian army formerly fought on the French side when Algeria was 
still a colony. According to them, France is still fighting Algeria indirectly through these 
officers. In other words, the Islamists claim that the liberation war did not end with formal 
independence, but continued through other means. Another advantage that Bouteflika has is 
that he was not in power when the election won by the FIS was cancelled. In a recent speech, 
he surprised many by stating explicitly that this cancellation itself was a form of violence. The 
President has attempted to gain the confidence of the Islamists, and has asked them to 
renounce violence, and to respect the formal institutions of State in which he says they will 
one day have their place. Prior to any agreement or discussion, however, the Islamists demand 
the removal of a number of high ranking army officers. This is the line that Bouteflika cannot 
cross, and it Is unlikely that time will give him the opportunity to do so. If he is to have any 
success in his negotiations with the Islamists, he will need to demonstrate his autonomy vis-a-
vis the Army. Yet this is very difficult to achieve. If Bouteflika is able to convince the Islamic 
groups to give up violence and accept the regime in power, he will be able to gain the trust 
and support of the Army. But if he falls to achieve this, then the political stalemate will 
continue for some time. 
Bouteflika knows that no settlement can be reached with the Islamists unless high ranking 
army officers who were involved in the decision to cancel the December 1991 election results 
are first removed from their posts. Yet these officers will put up fierce resistance if Bouteflika 
attempts to cross the thin red line' that separates civilian from military power. The President is 
thus caught between two sets of irreconcilable demands: the Army on the one side; the 
Islamists on the other. The very same officers who designated him President, in order to 
improve the regime's image abroad, are the ones the Islamists would most wish him to remove 
from office. 
The only concrete outcome so far of the negotiations that have been taking place between the 
Intelligence Services and the La Securité Militaire (Military Security) [19], since October 
1997, has been the law of civil concord'. This only extends the law to introduce a general 
amnesty for imprisoned Islamists who have not committed any violent offences. Negotiations 
have remained highly secretive, and even well-informed journalists do not know who is 
taking part in the discussions on either side. Neither does anyone know exactly what the 
Islamists are officially demanding. All the Islamic leaders are under surveillance, and none of 
them is permitted to give an interview to the press. Some observers are even questioning 
whether the negotiations that are claimed to have taken place did indeed occur. There is 
speculation that the talks may be a fiction invented by the Intelligence Services in order to 
further confuse the public about the current reality. It is believed that only the release of the 
two Islamic leaders, Abbassi Madani and All Belhadj would prove that a settlement had been 
reached between both sides. The logic of this peace process, which is controlled and overseen 
by the Intelligence Service, totally ignores the political aspects of the conflict in Algeria, and 
tries to resolve this conflict by legal means alone. The logic behind this seems to be that if a 
peace is brokered, then the Islamists will give back their weapons and will be forgiven for 
what they have done. The peace process has little chance of succeeding on either of these two 
grounds. 
Bouteflika also has to deal with the non-Islamist opposition, which will similarly judge him 
on the basis of his actions rather than his words. These groups are asking for a negotiated 
peace reached through a political settlement, and with a transparent negotiating process. To 
achieve this, the non-Islamist opposition is calling for a National Meeting which would bring 
together all political parties, including the FIS, to discuss ways of ending the crisis. Another 
goal of a National Meeting would be to establish dear guidelines regarding the need to respect 
of the outcome of elections, guarantees of freedom of speech, equality between the sexes and 
other related issues currently emerging as essential components of development 
An open and broadly-based meeting did take place in Rome in January 1995. This meeting 
was hosted by The SanfEgidio Community, and attended by the FIS, the FLN and the FFS. 
However, the document produced, by the partidpants [20] was violently rejected by the 
military who accused Italy and the Catholic Church of supporting terrorists and Interfering in 
matters of national sovereignty. In order to understand this reaction, we need to appredate that 
many high-ranking officers in Algeria believe that in general political parties are useless and 
can even be harmful to civil society. They also believe political parties should have no daim 
on the State or on Sovereignty, which continues to be embodied by the Army itself.[21] With 
officers trained within the confines of such a narrow political culture, there is little chance that 
Algeria will be able to put an end to the bloody, crisis that it has been experiencing for many 
years. 
The path towards peace is both very long and very fraught since each side in the conflict has 
its own interpretation of what peace means, according to their respective interests. The Army 
want peace on condition first of all that the Islamists forget what has happened in Algeria 
since 1992, and secondly on condition that the opposition agree to conform with the unwritten 
law of the Algerian political system, namely that the ultimate source of all political power lies 
in the Army.[22] The Islamists want peace as well, but only on condition that the high-
ranking military offidals involved In the crackdown on Islamists since cancellation of the 
December 1991 election results, are removed from their posts. President Boutefllka himself 
also wants to secure a peaceful settlement between the two sides, but he is confronted with 
two apparently insurmountable obstades, in the attitudes of both the Army and the Islamists 
themselves. 
The Army as a Political Party
After the October 1988 riots, the military hierarchy became convinced that political reforms 
were necessary. These reforms were only apparently democratic; the main aim was to appoint 
civilians from a wider range of backgrounds. Previously, the military had mainly appointed to 
office militants from the FLN. Political pluralism was legalized but the parties were not to put 
into question the prerogative of the Army in the matter of choosing the President. Elections 
were intended to lend legitimacy to decisions that had already been made, and the military 
hierarchy hoped the Islamists would accept this framework. From an ideological perspective, 
it is possible to envisage a compromise between the Army and the Islamists, particularly 
because one of the main sources of Algerian nationalism lies in Islam. Historically speaking, 
Algeria's particular brand of nationalism has been heavily influenced by the teachings of 
Islam, and the role Islam played in resistance to france is emphasized in the official history 
taught to children at school. 
However, It is Important to remind ourselves that the Army and the Islamists are not fighting 
over ideological issues. What is at stake is who controls the State. The regime in power, 
defended as always by the army, is exhausted and has lost much of its legitimacy due to its 
unpopularity and corruption. It is now also challenged by the Islamists who believe their own 
legitimacy is derived from their support among the most destitute parts of the population. The 
extreme violence of the conflict reflects that fact that what is at stake is sovereignty itself. 
Sovereignty is something which the Army clearly does want to give up, and something which 
the Islamists wish to seize, whether by the ballot or the bullet. The Islamists' desire to gain 
sovereignty was clearly reinforced by the decision of the Army to cancel the electoral victory 
of the FIS in January 1992. Yet, it is interesting to note that the military and the Islamists are 
similar in several ways. Both conceive the body politic as conflict-free, and therefore with no 
need for political parties. The military have sought to achieve an egalitarian society run by 
civil servants appointed by themselves and not by politicians. For the Islamists too, the aim is 
to create a society that abides by a single set of religious laws and thereby avoids open 
conflict. The kind of equality sought in such a society would be the equality of all believers, 
united by their religious convictions into a quasi-family. 
Having prevented political conflict from being expressed through an institutional framework, 
the military is now faced with an armed opposition that is supported by the most destitute 
among the Algerian population. This opposition who is eager for radical change and expresses 
the concerns of the marginalized through religious discourse and demands for cultural 
identity. The military's monopoly over politics has led to a politicization of the whole society, 
with political actions being judged according to religious standards. 
There has been a major shift in political discourse, with more radical terms being used by new 
actors emerging with their own conception of what the State should be and how it should 
relate to Society. Basically, the Islamists wish to reform the former in order to improve the 
condition of the latter. Within the worldview of the new Islamist actors, and according, to 
their Utopian vision, the Algerian State has consistently betrayed the hopes of the erstwhile 
popular liberation movement. There is an overwhelming feeling of deception and 
disappointment, since it was the State that was to have met the Algerian people's needs and 
hopes for social Justice. On the whole, the new political actors do not expect anything from a 
democracy that they regard as out of line with the precepts of Islam. Indeed they despite this 
democracy with the same contempt that the military has reserved for civilian pluralist politics, 
seen as an invention of competing elites who wish to conquer the State from the legitimate 
authority of the Army. The military appears to believe that if it loses control of the State then 
the Nation itself will be in danger. 
Since the military and the Islamists are unable to reach a compromise without one side or the 
other betraying their own political principles, there is a stalemate in Algerian political life. 
This is a game in which there can be only one winner; it is a zero-sum conflict. There cannot 
be two winners, in other words. Sovereignty is not regarded as something that can be shared 
or be the object of a political compromise. The Islamists insist that high ranking officers, just 
be brought to trial for their part in previous injustices, involving among other things, bribery 
and political assassinations. It is unlikely that the military would allow this to take place, and 
impeding the opposition from coming to power through the ballot box has been part of this 
defensive strategy on the part of the military. Democratic transition cannot take place until the 
Army and the Islamic opposition can somehow be convinced that it is in their mutual interests 
to reach some sort of political agreement or compromise. 
The Algerian experience shows that where the major protagonists feei that their lives, families 
and wealth are at stake and all their basic interests threatened, a shift in regime through 
democratic transition from authoritarian rule can fail completely. When electoral victory is 
seen only as an opportunity to crush the regime's opponents who have shown themselves 
openly, the losers who remain in office will stop at nothing to prevent the electoral transition 
from taking place. This leads to an atmosphere where the settling of scores is the main game. 
This is what accounted for the cancellation of the election results of December 1991, when 
the Islamists won. Some Islamist opponents of the government publicly threatened members 
of the ruling elite, demanding openly that they change their way of life, and accusing them of 
living in a manner that was contrary to Islamic values. Rumours spread immediately 
following the elections about people being arrested following accusations that they were 
living a lifestyle contrary to Islam, this gave rise to widespread fear. Taking advantage of this 
situation of panic, the Army pushed the President to resign and cancelled the elections in 
January, and then in turn arrested and jailed many of the Islamists who had been elected. A 
cycle of violence and repression, followed by more violence, was set into motion and this 
cycle continues in Algeria till today. After eight years of fighting, the civil war has now 
claimed an estimated 150,000 lives, causing huge human suffering. 
Some of those who consider themselves democrats supported the Army crackdown on the 
Islamists, and supported the cancellation of the election results, all in the name of democracy. 
The culture of the party system is so deep-rooted in Algeria that the so-called democratic 
parties did not acknowledge the basic need for political pluralism. To have some chance of 
succeeding, electoral democracy and democratic transition require that the major protagonists 
in the political contest share the conviction that electoral victory does not mean the right to 
defeat the opposition through violence and the gun. If the stakes are about living or dying, 
rather than simply winning or losing office, the electoral process may take place but transition 
will be frozen by the political stand-off likely to result As in Algeria, this stand-off is likely to 
unleash a dynamic of violence as other avenues of political expression become blocked off. In 
these conditions, the intervention of the Army is seen as unavoidable if order is to be 
defended and if those in power are to be protected from attack and danger. In future, elections 
in Algeria may only be able to result in a transition if they follow on after a National Contract 
or a Civic Pact has been achieved. The purpose of such a Contract or Pact would be to 
establish that all the parties involved in the electoral process agreed to commit themselves to 
respect the rules of democracy and to renouncing violence and the settling of accounts 
through killings after the outcome of a fair electoral process. A Contract of this kind had 
indeed been reached in January 1995 in Rome, but was later rejected by the Army as 
meaningless and non-binding. Clearly, a spirit of agreement is needed as well as a paper 
Contract The Army's control over the institutions of State confirms its status as a quasi-
political party, operating as a single parly system, somewhat reminiscent of other 
authoritarian single-party regimes, including the former supremacy of the Community Party 
in the Soviet Union. In Algeria the main difference is that this supremacy exists de facto, but- 
is nowhere written down in law or in the country's Constitution. Nonetheless, the actions of 
the Armed forces illustrate the way in which it works as a dominant political party on the 
national and international scene. 
In January 1992, for example, no longer trusting the elected President, the military asked him 
to resign. Once again in September 1998, the Chief of Staff of the Army asked President 
Lamine Zerouai to stop negotiating with the Islamists and asked him too to resign. The Chief 
of Staff was acting like the leader of a dominant political party. His disagreement with the 
President was shared by the majority of high-ranking officers, who meet regularly In a 
'conclave'. This is a kind of Central Committee or sovereign assembly which decides the 
military's position on a range of sensitive issues, from selecting candidates for the Presidency 
to deciding on the virtues and drawbacks of negotiations with the Islamist opposition. In a real 
sense, the Army emerges from this process as a sovereign body which controls the Presidency 
and the civilian regime, rather than an institution which serves the civilian regime, as formally 
stipulated by the Constitution. 
Relations between the Army and the Government - which does not control the Ministry of 
Defence - express the subordination of an executive institution to a sovereign authority which 
claims historically-derived legitimacy. The Army entrusts to civilian elites the task of running 
the State and implementing social and economic programs (industrialization during the 
seventies, agrarian reforms and health care policies). Such policies were inspired by the 
Army's populist goal of improving the living conditions of the poor peasants and the 
unemployed in the major cities. From the 1960s onwards, the Army considered itself to be 
pursuing the program it had been bequeathed by the liberation movement, and upon which its 
own legitimacy rested. This link ostensibly allowed and entitled the Army to claim to embody 
the interests of the Nation as a whole, and to be the only source of power. 
Both under the one party system (1962-1989) and under the multiparty system introduced by 
the 1989 Constitution, the Algerian political arena is characterized by the supremacy of the 
Army. The military wields sovereignty in non institutional forms and seeks to shape the 
opposition according to this peculiarity. Indeed, the military desires that parties which 
compete to be in Government compete on the basis of tasks of a technical nature, and do not 
concern themselves with issues of Sovereignty, Political parties are allowed to criticize the 
Government, and even the President, but never the Army itself. The National Assembly is a 
framework for formal debates and criticisms but the representatives cannot bring into question 
the prerogatives of me Army. As a consequence, the National Assembly deals only with the 
formal power of the President and the Government and never with the real, but informal, 
power of the Army. This situation results in two different kinds of political opposition; those 
who accept the underlying rationale of the regime and another opposition which challenges 
the assumption that the Army should remain unchallenged as the backbone of any political 
regime, whatever its part etiquette. The operation and rationale of the Algerian political 
system in recent decade has confirmed the view that in reality there is only one political party 
allowed - namely the Army. Making constant and implicit references to its position as a 
source of historical legitimacy for any civilian regime, the army claims for itself the ultimate 
right to control the civilian regime in power, and to retain for itself a monopoly of 'legitimate 
violence' under the cover of the State. The Army has agreed that reform of Algeria's political 
system is needed, but does so only on condition that the military itself does not have to give 
up the privileged position it has enjoyed since Independence in 1962. The outcome of this 
situation is a multi-party system in which various competing political parties are forever 
insulting each other and criticizing the Government. Yet at the same time, they are obliged to 
turn to the Army, asking them to grant civilian rulers the power to run the Institutions of State, 
whether by appointment or through recognizing the outcome of elections (whether rigged or 
fair). 
The dualistic structure of power within the operation of the State introduces relations of 
rivalry between the Ministry of Defence and the Presidency. State power is undermined 
insofar as the President seeks autonomy from the Army, but is appointed to office by the 
Army in the first place. Clientilistic political clans become powerful in this context where 
parties are delegitimized, some supporting the President, others supporting his opponents. 
When a civilian or journalist criticizes a high ranking officer, he or she almost always has 
been given the green light to do so from another high ranking officer, usually from those who 
are in a more powerful position than the officer(s) being criticized. High-ranking officers may 
seek to settle their own accounts among themselves by using civilian institutions, including 
political parties and the media. Within such a system, the civilian individual does not have the 
means to challenge an officer or to play a political role. The civilian concerned can only 
mount such a challenge if he or she is assured of the protection of officers better placed in the 
military hierarchy. In such a system, it is fair to say that in order to be taken seriously, the 
opposition may find itself obliged to resort to violence as a means of expressing its opposition 
to the status quo. The Islamists certainly understood their position in this way; they were 
explicitly seen as opponents by the Army, and any kind of settled agreement was only 
possible once they had resorted to violence. However, unlike isolated civilian opponents of 
the regime, the Islamists were able to confront the Army effectively, being more deeply 
rooted in society than any other political parties or movements. Many more of their members 
were also ready to fight, and if necessary to die in resorting to violent opposition to the regime 
and the Army. 
From time to time, the Algerian Army intervenes openly in military operations, but it 
intervenes covertly on a more permanent basis, through the Intelligence Service, the Military 
Security whose very name arouses a sense of fear. The Military Security, is under the control 
of the Ministry of Defence, and has the responsibility of watching over the political arena in 
order to guarantee the safety of the regime. It is organized rather like an underground party, 
and operates as if it were above the law, being regulated neither by the State authorities nor by 
the police or the judicial system. 
The role of the Military Security has certainly not facilitated the process of democratic 
transition from authoritarian rule, which was formally initiated by the 1989 Constitution. On 
the contrary, the Military Security, has eagerly encouraged violence by itself infiltrating the 
ranks of the Islamist movement and parties. The Army's intolerance of the Islamist position, 
and the verbal violence against the FIS of many so-called democrats were part and parcel of 
the military's strategy of discrediting freedom of speech and multi-partisan, pluralist political 
processes. The main aim was to demonstrate to the Algerian public that pluralist democracy 
represented a danger to civil order and to social peace. There was widespread infiltration of 
civilian political parties, the sowing of dissent and crises within and between the parties, and 
routine manipulation of the media, blackmail of journalists, threats against party militants and 
other 'dirty tricks' in the Military Security's toolkit. All these means were used to prevent civil 
society from developing in the direction of genuinely autonomous assodations. Any 
association not under the control of the Army is seen as per se a threat to the regime. All these 
observations serve to confirm the main argument in this chapter; namely that despite the 
occasional appearance of pluralism, the Algerian regime consistently operates as if it were a 
one party system. 
That anyone who is suspected of being involved in a subversive network can be arrested at 
any time by the Military Security, provides us with further evidence that in Algeria there is no 
rule of law. The Military Security, has however been taken aback by the FIS and the Islamists' 
popular support, since the military personnel involved were mainly trained to guard against 
the emergence of rival elites, rather than to police the popular masses. The military was not 
prepared for the popular upsurge of vioience on the present scale. In response to the 
widespread violent opposition to the regime, the Military Security has resorted to ever more 
blatant violations of human rights. The Army also uses all the means at its disposal to resist 
the proposal coming from many human rights organizations that there is a need for an 
International Commission of Inquiry into Human Rights abuses In Algeria.. 
The main reason the Army is so keen to keep a tight control over the political arena by means 
of the Military Security is to undermine the credibility of the civilian opposition and the 
autonomy of civil society. The goal is to be able to point to the (created) havoc caused by 'free 
expression' of various conflicting Interests, in contrast to the harmony arising from the single 
voice of a unified Algerian nation. The Army fears the emergence of a competing competent 
and autonomous political elite emerging from the ranks of civil society. The military wants to 
continue choosing which civilians are to run the State administration, and suspect civilians of 
being less parotic than themselves, since the Army embodies the Nation. Fully fourty years 
after Independence, Algerian political culture is still pervaded by this notion of historical 
legitimacy. The military still regards itself as the only channel through which State authority 
can be passed onto civilian politicians, on the condition that these civilians respect the 
unwritten law that the Army is to remain the sole source of power of the Algerian political 
system. 
The Army as Embodiment of the Nation 
and Master of the State
We need to bear in mind that the Army still regards itself as the most unswervingly patriotic 
element of the Algerian population. The military elite considers that its own commitment to 
the Algerian Nation has been fully tested over time. Higher-ranking officers in particular 
believe that their promotion places them closer to the origin of historical legitimacy, and 
believe that they are uniquely placed to set the ideal standards of nationalist behaviour and 
policy. Not only are they ready to die for their country (like the Islamists, ironically enough). 
They have also deliberately chosen the harshness of barracks life over the comfort and ease of 
a family and community. Their daily lives thereby symbolize the sacrifices that first liberated 
Algeria from foreign domination. Since he deters external (and internal) aggression against 
the State, the soldier can be regarded as the 'shield'1 of the Nation. As such, the soldier can be 
considered to hold the historical legitimacy from which any administrative authority must 
necessarily be derived. All mis is of course no more than an ideological representation, whose 
purpose is to justify the political supremacy of the Army, By monopolizing legitimacy to the 
detriment of the general development and refinement of State institutions, the Army has in 
fact prevented the integration of conflicting movements into the institutional structures of 
power. Its dominance has driven all those who seek reform or change into the arms of the 
Islamists, both by hampering the emergence of any real sense of citizenship and by 
completely smothering any autonomy for an emerging civil society. The political interest of 
military elites is to destroy and undermine the formation of any kind of public sphere for 
political debate and expression. The military makes frequent reference to the legacy of a 
national liberation struggle, but rarely invokes any respect for the rule of law. This is not 
surprising, since the rule of law would imply that the Army is just one institution among 
many, and should not be in overall control of the levels of State power. 
Conclusion
In conclusion, this chapter has tried to show that in Algeria's case, State power is divided into 
two elements: the element of sovereign power, which is not regarded as accountable, to any 
institution, and another element of power, which is detained by the Government and 
informally accountable to the Army. Executive power held by the State civilian power holders 
is conceived as a tool for implementing policies rather than deciding on matters of national 
sovereignty or security. The policies implemented by the executive power mainly concern the 
basic needs of the population. Sovereign power embodies the Nation Itself, and is concerned 
with defending the Nation against both its internal and external enemies. Of these two forms 
of State power, the first pertains to the Nation, the second to the State. 
Algerian history has not created a Nation-State; it has created a Nation and a separate state, 
linked by relations of subordination. A crisis has been generated, whose origins are to be 
found in the conception of the Nation and also in the limits imposed on the State. As in so 
many other countries, the Nation In Algeria is a mythical notion. But in Algeria the myth is 
more exaggerated to the extent that the citizens are united in the Nation not in their existing 
form, but in an idealized form derived from the ideological beliefs of the Army on the one 
hand, and the Islamists on the other. The competing images of the Algerian nation are so 
much in conflict that it is fair to say that the very idea of an Algerian Nation is in question. In 
a sense there are many Algerian Nations which serve to divide the people against each other. 
There have been at least three historically distinct concepts of the Nation in the past: the first 
was that of Messali Hadj, the populist; the second that of Abdelhamid Ben Badis, the early 
Islamist; and finally, that of Ferhat Abbbas, the national modernist. At Independence the 
competing foundations of these three forms of Nationalism were not reconciled. On the 
contrary, Independence divided them more than ever and their followers are still fighting one 
another today. Each political current within the nationalist movement has sought to take over 
the State and to eliminate its rivals. Each has its own idea of what the Nation should be, and 
seeks to impose these ideas by force on Society. In this ideological environment, a multiparty 
system does not lead smoothly or automatically to democratic transition or consolidation. 
Instead, it tends to arouse further intolerance and generate cycles of violence - that are 
difficult to put an end to. Whereas the Nation generally is seen as a unifying element of 
political life, in Algeria the idea of the Nation divides the population further. This in part 
accounts for the Army's own monopoly of legitimate violence, and explains why it is almost 
impossible for any civilian leader or movement to claim to speak on behalf of the Nation as a 
whole. The Army cannot but be involved with different political movements and parties, each 
with their different agendas and priorities. However, political rivalry also exists within the 
Army Itself, and can become more of a threat to civil peace than conflicts within civil society. 
Until recently, such divisions within the Army have been well hidden; however it is 
impossible to say whether this will continue to be the case, and whether the Army will 
continue to appear as a relatively stable and united force. 
One of the most distinctive features of Algeria's political system has been that the State has 
rarely embroiled Itself In the Ideological divisions that have split the Society. Whereas in 
most democratic countries, the non-military institutions of State have a political character, in 
Algeria their role is almost purely technical; they have been confined to the role of 
administrative tools specialized for management of economic resources and geared as far as 
possible towards meeting the people's daily needs. The State is not directly linked to the 
electorate; it is simply an instrument at the disposal of the civilian elites for obtaining civil 
peace through the redistribution of resources. Relations between the sovereign Nation -
embodied by the Army and not by the electorate - and the State administration shape the 
political realm in which institutions find their function in the hierarchy formed by the 
mythical Nation and the administrative State. 
In all representations of Algerian political life, there is a major difference between the Nation 
and the State. The Nation is an ideological construct, and cannot be concerned with political 
opposition, popular unrest or dally concerns. The State on the other hand, is an administrative 
instrument of control, assessed on its ability to ensure satisfaction for the people in material 
terms. Rightly or wrongly the main criticisms of the State are framed in terms of 
misdemeanours, the incompetence of civil servants and official corruption. The mythical 
Nation is thus in no way debased by such criticisms, which are almost uniquely directed at the 
Institutions of the civilian State. Such criticisms are of course bound to intensify as the 
executive institutions of the civilian State are less and less able to manage the deepening crisis 
which Algerian sodety is undergoing. 
There are many opportunities to make money when in public office In the State sector. This 
tends to attract less honest people who take jobs first serve themselves rather than the public. 
The resulting rejection of the State administrative institutions by the public fuels social 
tensions and violent unrest, leading on some occasions to riots and killing. It could be said 
that Algerian people love their Nation but dislike their State. Accordingly, even when the 
State comes under the fiercest criticism, this is on behalf of the Nation. Political parties 
compete for power, and when they are prevented from doing so, may claim that the Nation 
which they represent is in danger of disintegration. The Army, however, will not allow 
anyone but its own leaders to speak on behalf of the Nation as a whole, and will accuse any 
civilian who does so, of divisiveness and disloyalty or worse. 
The Algerian State is not what a "modern" state as political scientists would define it. It is 
certainly not an institutional framework able to balance the autonomy of the judiciary, the 
legislature and the executive arms of State power. As is the case in many Third World 
countries, the Algerian State does not provide a framework for supporting individual 
citizenship and neither does it allow or enable the free expression of competing political 
views, through political parties, popular participation and a respect for civil rights. In order for 
citizenship to be a meaningful term, political legitimacy should stem primarily from the 
electorate, through some process of elections perceived as free and fair, and resulting in the 
election of representatives who are involved in the formation of the Government. This is the 
theoretical schema within most democratic regimes, and is more or less the norm in most 
parliamentary democracies. 
To draw an analogy, in Algeria it is the Army rather than the electorate which provides the 
basis for political legitimacy within the system as it stands. This source of legitimacy is, by its 
nature, based on force and the threat of force. Since the civilian State administration draws its 
authority from the Army and not from the electorate, the State is weak compared to the Army 
and powerful in relation to Society, which is crushed by the lack of autonomous leverage over 
power holders, civil servants and the armed forces. This results in a generalized tendency for 
corruption and clientelism which pervade public life. For this reason, the State administration 
has all but lost its credibility among the majority of the Algerian populace, and particularly 
among the most destitute and marginalized elements of trie population. 
Being fully embroiled in the conflicts of civil society and the State administration, the Army 
is not as impartial as it ideally should be within a 'modern political system. Instead, it is used 
instrumentally by those who control its upper echelons for their own purposes, including the 
purpose of getting rid of adversaries and critics, and those merely considered as potential 
adversaries. The Army's strategy is to distribute the officers of State to more than one civilian 
political grouping, in order to hold each 'clan' in check and to hold in check their divisions. 
The State thus finds itself under the double demands of the military, which continues to keep 
a close eye on whatever is done by the State administration, and the Society, which expects 
the State administration to meet the social needs and political aspirations of the people. The 
military can see that their control over the Slate administration may have to be loosened 
somewhat. It seems they may be prepared to loosen their grip on the Government, and give 
political parties more room for manoeuvre, on condition that they can keep a tight rein on the 
process of appointing the President 
So long as Algerian political culture continues to be shaped by the legacy of the liberation 
struggle and national liberation movement, the Army will remain the single most important 
actor in the political field. Algeria gained its Independence through violence, and the 
consequence of this historical reality can be seen as twofold. In the first place, violence 
underpins most forms of civilian and administrative politics. Secondly, political conflict is 
defined primarily in terms of opposition to foreigners and their domestic allies, who are 
regarded as traitors to the Nation. Within the context of this particular political culture, 
democracy generally entails conflict and even war. 
In conclusion, the failure of the Algerian regime has mainly been a political failure. The Army 
has suffocated the State which was itself created through revolutionary violence. Throughout 
the world, the 1980s were a decade of post-populism and of a rapid transition from 
authoritarian rule towards more democratic forms of politics, and from state control towards 
the free market The Algerian Army has been out of step with this global trend, and has 
seemed to ignore the implications of the fall of the Berlin wall. Instead of giving the Nation 
statesmen of the ability of Colonel Boumediene from within its own ranks, the Army has 
preferred to hide behind the blunderings of a State run by incompetent civil servants. It is this 
politically created power vacuum that has encouraged the Islamists to try and take over the 
institutions of the State and claim historical legitimacy from the Army, both by the ballot and 
the bullet 
Notes 
 
 
[1] Cf. Addi (1990) 
[2] In the declaration of 19 June 1965, the various charges against Ben Bella, which were 
used to justify the coup against him, are listed in some detail 
[3] There is no reference in any public document to the Army's role in forming the 
Government On the contrary, the various Constitutions (1963, 1976, 1989) stipulate that the 
President is the supreme commander of the armed forces, which in turn have the duty to obey 
his Government 
[4] This hypothesis is developed in the study by Addi (1994). 
[5] In the Proclamation of 19 June 1965, the expression used was 'revolutionary readjustment'. 
This was not simply propaganda. In practice, military power, which incarnated political 
legitimacy, was therefore entitled to put an end to the mandate it had extended to even the 
head of State, the President himself. The President was thus accountable to the Army and not 
to the people. Cf. Annuaire de l'Afrique du Nord (1966). 
[6] Cf. Leca and Vatin (1976) 
[7] Stability is of course also obtained through the use of compromise, alliances, allocation of 
jobs, exclusion and other forms of more or less overt pressure and persuasion 
[8] Massinissa was a Berber chief during classical times, and under his rule Numidie became 
a prosperous state, Abdelmoumem was one of the Almohad emperors who promoted the 
expansion of Arab and Islamic civilization in North Africa and in Spain 
[9] The present crisis in Algeria is precisely this; a crisis of legitimacy, which shakes the very 
foundations of state power in the country. See Addi (1993) 
[10] 0.Touraine(1974). 
[11] See Addi (1999b) on the patriarchal structures of Algerian society. 
[12] I use the classical sociological distinction between society and community as employed 
by Marx, Tönnies, Durkheim and Weber, in order to analyze the process of social 
differentiation, including the growing awareness of members of a particular society that they 
constitute a sovereign political body and the ultimate repositary of legal authority. This 
process results in the separation of the political sphere from the spheres of religion, morality 
and psychology 
[13] Cf. Weber (1947) 
[14] Algeria has had two major charismatic figures with which the nation Identified, and 
whose political legitimacy was acknowledged. The fist was Messali Hadj, leader of the 
nationalist movement until 1954, who Incarnated the national community forged out of the 
idealism of the independence struggle, and Houari Boumédiene in the 1970s, who incarnated 
the popular goal of economic development 
[15] This Is the crucial difference between the Algerian regime and the Soviet regime, where 
the Communist Party was in control of both the Army and the KGB. 
[16] There were many indicators that the Military Security had instructed the government to 
lend all support needed for the election campaign of Bouteflika 
[17] See Addi (1996). 
[18] See Addi (1998,1999a). 
[19] la Sécurité Militaire is the most powerful institution, organized as a political police 
above the judiciary. For more Information, see Reporters Sans Frontieres (1996) 
[20] See la Plate-forme de Rome (1995) 
[21] See Addi (1994). 
[22] See Addi (1998). 
